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Abstract There is a common problem in artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and information security. In AI, an expert
system needs to be able to justify and explain a decision to
the user. In information security, experts need to be able to
explain to the public why a system is secure. In both cases,
an important goal of explanation is to acquire or maintain
the users’ trust. In this paper, I investigate the relation
between explanation and trust in the context of computing
science. This analysis draws on literature study and concept
analysis, using elements from system theory as well as
actor-network theory. I apply the conceptual framework to
both AI and information security, and show the benefit of
the framework for both fields by means of examples. The
main focus is on expert systems (AI) and electronic voting
systems (security). Finally, I discuss consequences of the
analysis for ethics in terms of (un)informed consent and
dissent, and the associated division of responsibilities.
Keywords Actor-network theory  Confidence  Expert
systems  Explanation  Information security  Informed
consent  Systems theory  Trust
Introduction
In real life, we are tempted to trust persons if they can
explain to us why they do what they do. And we are
tempted to trust a car if the dealer can tell us why it is safe
(which is harder if you just had to call back lots of cars
because of safety issues).1 This is often how trust appears
to work: it involves a (more or less elaborate) explanation
of the person or thing that we may or may not trust. Such
explanations we may simply accept, or we may base our
decisions upon them. If you have given me satisfactory
explanations in the past, I may even refrain from requesting
them in the future.
In this sense, explanation and trust seem to be common
partners in everyday life. What I focus on in this paper, is
the special case of interactions in the digital environment.
Also in the digital world explanation and trust show up
together quite often, and in very different domains. Arti-
ficial agents need to explain their decision to the user in
order to gain trust, and the designers of secure websites
need to explain to the banking client why they can safely
do their transactions online.
Trust in digital environments has been called ‘e-trust’,
and the question whether this is possible at all has received
considerable attention.2 Issues that could influence one’s
opinion here are (1) whether trust is possible without face-
to-face interaction and (2) whether artificial agents are
capable of trusting and/or being trusted. In the present
analysis, I assume that e-trust is possible based on the
simplifying assumption that trust refers to ‘‘expectations
which may lapse into disappointments’’.3 Still, not all
indicators for real-life trust can be relied on with e-trust. As
mechanisms that relate to embodied presence are unavail-
able in digital environments, explanation is especially
important as a condition for e-trust. Similarly to the
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concept of e-trust, I speak about e-xplanation to refer to
digital forms of explanations, or traditional forms of
explanation that concern digital devices.
In this paper, I will investigate the relation between
e-xplanations and e-trust from a philosophical perspective.
After discussing the research background and definitions of
the necessary concepts (‘‘Preliminaries’’), I will analyse
this relation based upon literature study and conceptual
analysis (‘‘E-xplanation and e-trust’’). Combining Niklas
Luhmann’s view on trust with an actor-network view on
social relations, the conceptual analysis integrates the
notions of explanation, trust and black box with respect to
their relation in information systems. Following this, I will
apply the analysis to both information security (‘‘Expla-
nation and trust in information security’’) and artificial
intelligence (AI; ‘‘Explanation and trust in AI’’). Finally, I
discuss the ethical consequences of the analysis (‘‘Ethical
consequences’’), and draw conclusions on its benefits and
limitations (‘‘Conclusions’’).
The contributions of this research are (1) the notion of
explanation program and its relation to explanation trees,4
(2) an account of the relation between explanation and trust
based on system theory and actor-network theory, (3) the
application of this analysis to AI and information security




In artificial intelligence, research has been done into
explanation in expert systems. Expert systems are systems
that suggest solutions to problems that would normally
require a human expert to solve. Such problems may
include medical diagnosis, industrial process analysis, and
financial decisions. A particular type of such systems are
case-based reasoning systems, in which solutions to prob-
lems are proposed based on retrieval of similar problems
from memory, and adapting their solutions. Explanation in
such systems has been addressed by Sørmo et al. (2005)
and Roth-Berghofer and Cassens (2005). In a quite dif-
ferent setting, research has also been done into explana-
tions for belief-desire-intention (BDI) agents in virtual
training environments.5
Ye and Johnson (1995) give three possible types of
explanations in expert systems: traces, justifications and
strategies. With traces, a detailed record of reasoning steps
is given. Justifications focus more on the logical argument,
whereas strategies are higher-level approaches that the
expert system applies to the information it possesses.
Empirical research into user’s trust in agents has
revealed some interesting results that provide inspiration
for the present analysis. Glass et al. (2008) conclude that
trust depends on granularity of explanations and on
transparency of the system. Another study compares dif-
ferent explanation interfaces for recommender systems in
terms of user trust.6 The results suggest that what the
authors call an ‘organisation-based’ explanation does a
better job than a simple computational explanation of why
a recommendation shows up in the list. In organisation-
based approaches, recommendations are categorised
according to common features. Benefits of explanations in
intelligent systems are discussed by Gregor and Benbasat
(1999). This paper offers an account of why explanations in
computer systems are a good idea in the first place, from a
psychological perspective.
From a computer security perspective, there is quite a
substantial amount of research into trust.7 Here, the ques-
tion is how it is possible to communicate the analysis that
experts have made of a security-sensitive system to the
public. Why is it secure? Or, more appropriately: How is it
secure? Thus, it is (implicitly) assumed that explanations
are required for trust. Explanations are thought to bridge
the gap between ‘actual security’ and ‘perceived security’,
which, when taken beyond its common sense meaning, is a
philosophical problem in itself.8
In this paper, I focus on the case of electronic voting
(e-voting). When paper voting was gradually replaced by
electronic voting machines or even Internet voting, this led
to debates in various countries. In the USA, public pressure
has enforced the printing of paper copies of each vote cast
on a machine.9 In the Netherlands, electronic voting has
been abolished altogether based on the research and per-
severance of a pressure group.10 Parallel to these devel-
opments, new electronic voting schemes were designed in
computing science, but the security of such schemes is
complicated, and users may not be easily convinced. In the
testing trajectory of a Dutch Internet voting system, too
complex vote verification procedures reduced trust in the
system.11
4 The latter in a philosophical rather than technical sense, cf. Freuder
et al. (2000).
5 Harbers et al. (2009).
6 Pu and Chen (2006).
7 Shneiderman (2000), Fahrenholtz and Bartelt (2001), Nikander and
Karvonen (2001), Chopra and Wallace (2002), Oostveen and Van den
Besselaar (2004), Randell and Ryan (2006).
8 Pieters (2010).
9 Mercuri (2002).
10 Gonggrijp et al. (2006).
11 Hubbers et al. (2005).
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Explanations of security are not just aspects of usability,
which is also important in electronic voting. Of course,
easy operation and good instructions on how to use the
system are vital, but this problem has been dealt with
elsewhere.12 Here, I focus on responses to questions on
how the votes are protected. Lack of such explanations
does not prevent users from being able to operate the
devices, but may nevertheless make them refrain from
doing so.
In artificial intelligence, explanations are usually pro-
vided by the system itself. In information security, expla-
nations are provided by the designers.13 Nonetheless, in
both artificial intelligence and information security, the
role of explanations consists for a major part of acquiring
and maintaining the trust of the user of the system. From
the AI perspective as well as the information security
perspective, there is a need for a better understanding of the
relation between explanation and trust. In order to achieve
this, we first need to look at definitions of central concepts.
Central concepts
Explanation
Dictionary definitions of the verb ‘explain’ acknowledge
that explanations may have different goals: they may be
about describing something in detail, about offering rea-
sons, or about giving instructions on how to do something.
I do not consider the latter category here. In computer
science, this type amounts to explanations on how to use
the system, which are instructions rather than explanations
in a stricter sense. I focus on the meanings of justification
(offering reasons) and transparency (describing in detail).
Roth-Berghofer and Cassens (2005) and Sørmo et al.
(2005) distinguish five different explanation goals for case-
based reasoning expert systems: justification (explain why
the answer is a good answer), transparency (explain how
the system reached the answer), relevance (explain why a
question asked is relevant), conceptualisation (clarify the
meaning of concepts) and learning (teach the user about the
domain). Relevance can be seen as a special kind of jus-
tification. Conceptualisation and learning have goals sim-
ilar to instruction, which we said we would not discuss.
The remaining two goals, transparency and justification,
are the central ones in the present framework.
When an explanation is given with respect to a specific
goal, certain aspects of it may require further explanation.
These are called subgoals. In this paper, I make use of
explanation trees to visualise the relation between expla-
nation goals and subgoals. An explanation tree is a tree in
which the goals and subgoals of an explanation are ordered
systematically (see Fig. 1). Whereas Freuder et al. (2000)
use the concept in a technical sense, I interpret it in the
wider context of explaining the decisions or design of a
system to the user.
In information security, such trees have a close relation
to attack and defence trees.14 An attack tree is a tree in the
mathematical sense in which possible ways to compromise
the security of an information system are systematically
ordered. The nodes in the tree correspond to the different
steps that an attacker would have to take to break into the
system. It is possible to construct a similar tree with
defence measures, a defence tree.
Similarly, we can construct a pair of a question and an
explanation tree when the concern is not securing the
system, but making it able to provide the user with
explanations. If the system is not able to give the user
sufficient information, the ‘attack’ has succeeded.
As in attack trees, nodes in explanation trees can be
AND or OR nodes. An AND node indicates that all con-
nected subgoals need to be realised in order to make the
explanation successful; an OR node means that only one of
the subgoals needs to be achieved. For reasons of conci-
sion, I include both questions and answers in the same tree,
using indentation to represent subgoals (i.e. subquestions).
We will see further in the paper that explanation trees
have very different characteristics in security and AI,
respectively.
Trust
Trust is a form of self-assurance. It entails reliance upon
something else, and the belief that this other will not fail in
meeting certain expectations. However, the grounds on
which self-assurance is based can be quite different.
In earlier work,15 I distinguished between confidence
and trust in information systems based on the work of
Niklas Luhmann (1979, 1988). Confidence means self-
assurance of the safety or security of a system without
knowing the risks or considering alternatives. Trust means
self-assurance by assessment of risks and alternatives. The
Fig. 1 Example explanation tree
12 See e.g. Bederson et al. (2003).
13 Even when the system explains, the designer of course designs the
method of explanation. This will be dealt with further in the paper in
terms of the concept of delegation.
14 Schneier (1999), Mauw and Oostdijk (2006).
15 Pieters (2006).
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essential difference is that in case of trust, a decision is
made to rely or not to rely on the person or system. In daily
life, we rely on many expectations without consciously
considering the possible impact in case of failure. We have
confidence in electricity supply, in people obeying traffic
rules, etc. When there are different options possible, such
as in choosing a bank for one’s savings, a comparison
needs to be made, and trust takes the place of confidence.
Thus, if I choose to live in a high part of the Netherlands
because I have always lived there, I have confidence in the
safety of the place. If I choose to live in a high part because
it may be less risky if sea levels rise, I have trust in it. In the
former, the alternatives and the decision are implicit. In the
latter, they are explicit.
Similar examples are found in relation to digital devices.
If a voting system functions properly, people will have
confidence in it without exactly knowing how it works or
considering alternatives. The voting system can be said to
be reliable when able to acquire such confidence. When
problems arise and e-voting and paper voting are compared
as alternatives based on risk assessment, trust (or distrust)
takes the place of confidence. The conclusion of my earlier
analysis was that by drawing a clear distinction between
e-voting and paper voting, a pressure group in the Neth-
erlands succeeded in creating consensus on the necessity
for voting systems to be trustworthy (suitable for acquiring
trust), rather than reliable (suitable for acquiring confi-
dence) only. This is because when two alternatives are
compared, their properties need to be visible. This was not
the case with the existing e-voting systems.
This analysis can be generalised to other technologies.
Computer security experts generally aim at exchanging
confidence for trust by explicating the risks of systems. We
have seen this with building access cards, privacy in
Facebook, and many more. The question I ask in this paper
is which role explanations play in the dynamics of confi-
dence and trust. The concepts of trust, confidence, reli-
ability and trustworthiness are used as explained above, to
clarify the distinctions between the different human-com-
puter relations. In other discourses, they may have different
meanings.16
Black boxes
Following this line of reasoning, there is a difference
between trust, where risks are perceived and compared, and
confidence, where risks are not perceived and compared.
Which relations are possible is partly determined by fea-
tures of the technology under consideration. Observability
is an important aspect here, and this has been discussed
elsewhere under the denominator of black boxes. This
concept, again, relates to the explanations that can be given
by the system.
In both expert systems and security-sensitive systems,
the black box character of systems lacking explanations is
often mentioned.17 The concept of black box then denotes a
lack of visibility or observability. As it is easily argued that
black box systems are not trustworthy either, as we have
seen in the previous discussion of confidence and trust, the
concept of black box can form an important connection
between explanation and trust. However, this concept can
mean very different things depending on the language
game in which it is used. We therefore need to distinguish
these meanings clearly before we proceed.
At least two meanings of black box can be distin-
guished. In the common sense meaning, a black box is
something that outputs something based on certain inputs,
but that we do not know the inner workings of. This applies
above all to technological artefacts. In a more philosophi-
cal sense, as advanced by Latour (2005) in his actor-net-
work theory, a black box is something that has been
‘blackboxed’; a theory or technology of which the sup-
porting network of actants has become invisible. An actant,
according to Latour, is anything that participates in actions
in a network of relations, and becomes what it is by means
of the network. In the latter sense, other phenomena such as
scientific theories or political systems can be characterised
as black boxes as well. As there is no opportunity to discuss
actor-network theory in detail here, the important point to
remember is that black boxes need not always be purely
technological.
In the first sense, a black box consists only of non-
human parts. This is what is usually meant when it is said
that electronic voting machines are black boxes. In the
second sense, both humans and non-humans can be part of
a black box. In this sense, paper voting could be said to be
a ‘blacker box’ than electronic voting, because the network
around paper voting has been largely concealed over its
relatively long history, hiding risks and security measures
inside. It is the latter meaning in which I will use the
concept of black box in the following.
Latour associated the process of blackboxing with three
other phenomena: translation, composition and delegation.
I will use these concepts in my analysis of explanation and
trust, but first I will discuss the meaning given to these
concepts by Latour.
Composition means that actants in a network form a
composite actant to which actions can be attributed. In this
way, the government and an electronic voting machine
manufacturer can be ‘composed’ when they address the
security of the machines, or an expert system and its
16 Avizˇienis et al. (2004).
17 Harris (2003), Nugent and Cunningham (2005), Gonggrijp et al.
(2006), Open Rights Group (2007).
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designer can be composed when justifying the decisions of
the system. Translation denotes that intentions and possi-
bilities for action change when actants join forces. Latour
calls these intentions and possibilities the ‘action program’.
Following a traditional example, a man plus a gun has
different action possibilities than a man or a gun alone.18
Lastly, part of an action program can be delegated to dif-
ferent actants. The responsibility of keeping an eye on the
speed limit can thus be delegated to a ramp.
In the following, I will combine the actor-network ter-
minology with the accounts of explanation and trust, in
order to get a comprehensive understanding of their
relation.
E-xplanation and e-trust
In this section, I combine the notions of explanation, trust
and black box, as discussed above, in a conceptual analysis
of their relation in information systems. The analysis thus
combines Luhmann’s definitions of trust and confidence
with an actor-network view on social relations. This
combination is pragmatic rather than aimed at authenticity
to the original viewpoints of the sources.
Explanation programs
In the following, I ‘translate’ the actor-network concepts to
the field of explanation and trust. First of all, the type of
action that we are specifically interested in is explanation.
Actants can thus be said to have an explanation program,
i.e. their action program projected on the domain of
explanation. When actants are asked to explain something
about a theory or system, they have certain intentions and
possibilities for explaining in a certain way. This expla-
nation program is translated when actants join forces. For
example, the government plus a commercial manufacturer
has different explanation possibilities than the government
alone when it comes to e-voting: because of commercial
interests, it may no longer be able to reveal the source code
of the program used.
Responsibilities for explanation can be delegated to
other actants, but this also means that the explanation
program changes, because the other actants will have dif-
ferent interests and a different understanding of the prob-
lem. This holds both for delegation to other humans or
organisations, and for delegation to machines. In both
cases, the new actant will not have the same capabilities for
explanation as the actant that delegated the responsibility
for explanation to it. If explanation of decisions is dele-
gated to an expert system, it will have different explanation
possibilities than its designer, if only because it has more
limited knowledge of the world.
Delegation means exchanging one’s own trust for con-
fidence: in delegation, one no longer needs to understand
what is to be explained fully oneself. Instead, one has
confidence in the actant to which the responsibility of
explanation is delegated.
An explanation program can be represented in an
explanation tree, as a security policy can be represented in
a defence tree. The formal composition of explanation
programs and explanation trees of different actants, both
for cooperation and for delegation, would be a topic for
further study.
Explanation-for-{trust, confidence}
An explanation may have different goals, as we have seen.
The most important goals I distinguished are transparency
and justification. Depending on the goal, an explanation
can either aim at acquiring confidence or at acquiring trust.
Explanation-for-trust can thus be contrasted with expla-
nation-for-confidence. When we remember that trust
entails a decision and confidence does not, the former aims
at enabling the user to compare different alternatives by
describing them in detail. The latter aims at allowing the
user to be confident in using a system, without having to
consider different options.
Explanation-for-trust is explanation of how a system
works, by revealing details of its internal operations.
Explanation-for-confidence is explanation that makes the
user feel comfortable in using the system, by providing
information on its external communications. In explana-
tion-for-trust, the black box of the system is opened; in
explanation-for-confidence, it is not.
In both meanings of the concept of black box, a black
box cannot acquire trust, but only confidence. Black boxes
can be explained to their environment, but only as an
explanation-for-confidence: the explanation concerns the
external communications of the system. Black boxes can be
opened when trust is required instead of confidence; this
opening produces an explanation-for-trust of how the
system or network does what it is supposed to do; it reveals
part of the inner workings, thereby reveals part of the risks,
and thereby trades confidence for (possible) trust.19
A network has an explanation program that can reply to
questions on transparency and justification. This explana-
tion program is distributed over (delegated to) different
18 Verbeek (2005).
19 Following Vico (Berlin 1976), we may argue that we can
understand better something that we have created ourselves than
something that is ‘given’. In that sense, the human mind is more a
black box than a computer system, and we can explain the decisions
of a computer system better than those of a human mind. Apparently,
this does not mean that we trust a computer more than a human being.
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actants in the network. If the network can only reply to
questions of justification, it can be considered a black box.
In such a case, the network can only acquire confidence of
the environment. Once trust is required, the black box
needs to be opened in order to supply explanations-for-
trust, in response to questions of transparency. In the latter
case, the system thus needs to be designed in such a way
that this is actually possible; this amounts to design for
transparency.
If the explanation program of the network around a
technology is strong enough, the black box of the inner
mechanisms of the technology itself may not need to be
opened. This was the case with electronic voting in the
Netherlands before the efforts of a pressure group com-
manded explanations aiming for transparency.
Explanation and trust in information security
In the domain of information security, explanation of the
security of the system to the user is an important require-
ment. This is especially true because security is not
instantly visible in using a system, as security of a system
is not a functional requirement. One cannot argue that
because the system produces acceptable results, it is
therefore secure. Intruders may have broken in and chan-
ged results without anyone noticing. Instead, insight must
be given in the measures that have been taken to protect the
system against intruders.
Users also need to be instructed in how to operate the
system securely, for example checking whether they are
really communicating with the e-banking site by means of
the certificate. This is not the type of explanation I focus on
here, as it is another example of explanation meaning
instruction. Here, we are interested in the role of expla-
nations that allow the user to form an opinion about (the
security of) the system.
In the case of information security, explaining is about
describing something in detail, in this case the security
measures that are implemented in the system in order to
protect the user and the system from harm. Transparency is
usually seen as the main goal, especially in e-voting, and it
is considered essential for allowing the users to understand
what the designers have done to protect them. Whether
transparency also contributes to the security of the system
itself is heavily debated: some would argue that making the
protection mechanisms public will enhance the capabilities
of the attackers, whereas other would argue that protection
mechanisms can be improved by public scrutiny. In the
latter case, explanations of what procedures are built into
the design and what procedures exist if something goes
wrong would then contribute to transparency. Keeping the
security mechanisms inside the black box, disabling
explanations for transparency, is often referred to as
‘security by obscurity’.20
The security of a system thus needs to be explained to
the user in order to allow her to make an informed decision
on whether to use it. The explanation is an explanation-for-
trust. This is, of course, only useful if alternatives are
available. For example, in the Netherlands, citizens can
decide for themselves whether they wish to be a donor, and
the information provided is meant to enable them to make a
reasonable decision on whether to accept the procedure. In
case of an obligatory measure, like an electronic ID card or
passport, it is more important to create confidence, as
people do not have a choice.
The primary question in security is thus a ‘how’: the
user may request an explanation of how the system is
secured, before agreeing to use it. However, even if the
main goal is transparency, this may involve subgoals that
can be of a different type. The explanation programs are
usually associated with the designers rather than the system
itself. Of course, part of the explanation program can be
delegated to the system, e.g. in the form of a help function,
as long as the help offered is not only instruction on how to
use the program, but also information on how it works and
how it is protected.
Once transparency is established (how?), questions may
be asked regarding the reasons for design decisions,
including security measures (why?). The explanation goal
then changes from transparency into justification. This can
be represented in subgoals in the explanation tree (Fig. 2).
In the tree, although not represented, different explanations
are possible for the same question. These explanations may
in turn trigger different follow-up questions. In design,
such explanation requirements can be anticipated by
including explanation trees in the design process, which
would be a topic for further research.
As I have argued before, the explanation program in
information security is typically delegated to the designers
of the system. This means that explanation is not an
explicit part of the design of the system, but rather a
(business) strategy for dealing with questions about
security.
Our case study in the information security field is e-
voting. This is the same topic that I addressed in my earlier
Fig. 2 An example explanation tree for information security
20 Mercuri and Neumann (2003).
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work.21 I extend the analysis that was given there with the
concepts of explanation and black box.
In electronic voting, two approaches can be distin-
guished: the Dutch and the British. In a comparative case
study of the Dutch and British discourses on electronic
voting, based on in-depth interviews with key stakeholders
in Fall 2006, we found that the Dutch discourse focused on
one option for all voters, whereas the British discourse
emphasised the ability of voters to choose the channel that
suits them best.22 In the Dutch case, there was one channel
available to the citizens to cast their votes, which would be
electronic or paper. The local authorities decided which
channel would be used (paper has been the only option
since a change of law in 2009). In the UK e-voting pilots,
multiple channels were offered to the voters, and they
could decide themselves which one they wished to use. In
the Dutch case, the government needed to create confi-
dence in the systems used, since citizens did not have the
choice to go for a different option. In the British case,
explanations of the systems could have the role of allowing
citizens to choose, enabling trust rather than confidence.
In electronic voting, an explanation-for-confidence of
the use of electronic voting machines is that they produce
faster results. Or, alternatively, that they are more reliable
and accurate than paper voting. Or, alternatively, that they
have been tested by an accreditation organisation. In such
explanations, the black box of the system is not being
opened. The primary goal is justification.
An explanation-for-trust would be an account of the
measures that have been implemented to guarantee secu-
rity. At the highest level of detail, the source code could be
made available. The latter, of course, would not be an
explanation for the general public, and may therefore not
be sufficient to establish public trust in the system. The
primary goal in such explanations is transparency.
Following this distinction, we can argue that the Dutch
government should have had an explanation program that
aimed for confidence, whereas the British government
should have aimed for trust. Indeed, in the Dutch case, the
government for a long time clung to the explanation that
there was nothing wrong with the electronic voting
machines, even when their security was challenged by the
pressure group. From the analysis of explanation in relation
to confidence and trust, this was a sensible way to handle
the issue: as citizens did not have a choice, confidence in
the existing system needed to be upheld.
In the British case, the government could be much more
pragmatic: if the security of any of the systems would be
challenged, this could be investigated thoroughly, and if
the system was found not to be trustworthy, it could be
excluded from further pilots.
The situation in the Netherlands can also be explained in
terms of black boxes. Following Latour’s analysis of
technology, an e-voting system is composed of a network
of actants, humans and non-humans. Part of the network
may be black-boxed; the inner workings are not being
observed from the outside.
The e-voting systems that were introduced in the
Netherlands in the early nineties were able to hide in the
existing black box of the voting system. One may argue
that the paper voting system had gradually become a black
box over its relatively long history. The electronic voting
machines were put inside without opening it. However,
even for paper voting it has not always been like that:
major debates have happened on the replacement of oral
voting with paper voting.23
In any case, the black box was not opened further when
electronic voting machines were introduced. An explana-
tion-for-confidence was enough: e-voting would be faster
and more accurate. Many e-voting systems of the same
generation were black boxes in the common sense mean-
ing. From a Latourian perspective, however, they are part
of a network that helps to maintain the black box status of
the whole network: the inner workings—not only of the
technology but of its socio-technical surroundings as
well—are kept invisible to the environment, for example
by keeping evaluation reports secret.
Gradually, black box voting became subject to increas-
ing scrutiny, by pressure groups as well as the scientific
information security community. These developments
required the black boxes to be opened; they led to a
requirement for explanations-for-trust, related to transpar-
ency. Now that most countries have been studying their
existing e-voting solutions following public pressure, a
new generation of voting systems seems to be needed that
can actually provide explanations-for-trust (or at least their
designers should be able to provide these). This, however,
is not trivial, as a bad explanation-for-trust may fail to
create trust, and even lead to distrust.
What can happen to e-voting once the trust issues have
been solved? If it will be a successful project at all,
adjusting the explanation program to the requirements of
the environment is necessary. To achieve this, new actors
may need to be pulled into the network, which are able to
complete the explanation tree of the system. Such actors
21 Pieters (2006).
22 A qualitative case study of the e-voting discourses in the UK and
the Netherlands was performed based on the theory of strategic niche
management. In both countries, eight e-voting experts were inter-
viewed on their expectations, risk estimations, cooperation and
learning experiences. The results show that differences in these
variables can partly explain the variations in the embedding of e-
voting in the two countries, from a qualitative point of view (Pieters
and van Haren 2007). 23 Park (1931).
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may include pressure groups. Getting the actors in the e-
voting network requires making them trust the project. If
the supporting network is stabilised in this way, confidence
of the environment may be established. Only then can e-
voting become a black box in the Latourian sense, by
making the explanation program hide the details of the
inner workings (again).
Explanation and trust in AI
In the case of AI, the most important explanation goal is
justification, or offering reasons for an action. The reason
for a decision, diagnosis or advice needs to be justifiable to
the user. The primary question is a ‘why’; the main goal of
explanation in expert systems is justification.
Interestingly, in the history of AI, reasoning traces,
which can be characterised as ‘how’-explanations, preceded
the ‘why’-type.24 The easiest way of telling the user what is
going on is just dumping what has been going on in the
system. In this sense, the ‘why’-explanations are techno-
logically more advanced, as they require a more subtle
judgement on what should and what should not be shown to
the user. Still, this also holds for the ‘how’ explanations in
security, as we have seen in the previous section.
Even though the primary goal in AI is justification, the
other explanation goals for case-based reasoning systems
can occur as subgoals in an explanation tree with justifi-
cation as the root goal. For example, in order to justify a
decision, it may be necessary to explain certain concepts,
or to provide more detail about how the system reached the
decision. Thus, whereas the main goal in AI can be char-
acterised as justification, other goals play a role as well.
Subgoals may thus include transparency of system
design; from this point on, trust is the issue instead of
confidence. For example, if the user does not have confi-
dence in the explanation, she may wish to find out how the
system constructed that explanation. She may suspect an
error in the system, and will now proceed to request
transparency. The explanation goal then changes from
justification into transparency. This can be represented in
subgoals in the explanation tree (Fig. 3).
Note that the last question in the depicted tree, asking
for an explanation on the design of the reasoning system,
cannot be answered from the explanation program of the
machine itself. Usually, answering this question should be
done by the designer, except when it has been delegated to
the machine via a help function. Note also that there is an
analogy between explanations in AI and a common dis-
tinction in philosophy of science: the distinction between
the context of discovery and the context of justification.
Explanations-for-confidence then correspond to the context
of justification (of a decision), whereas explanations-for-
trust correspond to the context of discovery (of a decision).
In AI systems, the black box character is not necessarily
a problem. As long as the users have confidence in the
decisions of the system, they may not be interested in how
it works. Therefore, the explanations of expert systems are
mainly explanations-for-confidence. Only when the user
suspects that something is wrong, transparency will be
required by means of explanations-for-trust.
The explanation trees in artificial intelligence are in a
way mirrored with respect to information security. In
security, justification emerges as a subgoal when an answer
to a transparency question is not sufficient to the user. In
AI, transparency emerges as a subgoal when an answer to a
justification question is not sufficient. It seems that expla-
nations-for-confidence and explanations-for-trust alternate
when deeper levels of explanation are asked for. Therefore,
the type of question (transparency or justification) that is
invited by the outer appearance of the system determines
whether the explanation tree will be, so to say, ‘even’ or
‘odd’. This mirror effect is one of the interesting results of
the analysis. To understand the consequences of this result,
a further dialogue between security and AI on the topic of
explanation would be beneficial.
If expert systems can reach a level of explanation that
creates as much confidence in these systems as we have in
people, they may become increasingly blackboxed phe-
nomena in our society. The need for knowing precisely
how they work may become less pronounced, even if we
know more about how they work than we know about how
people work, for we designed expert systems ourselves.
Ethical consequences
The analysis of explanation and trust has ethical conse-
quences when we connect it to the notion of informed
consent, which can be defined as ‘‘an autonomous author-
isation by a patient or subject’’.25 When a subject autono-
mously authorises a certain treatment or risk, she thereby
Fig. 3 An example explanation tree for an expert system
24 Ye and Johnson (1995). 25 See e.g. Faden et al. (1986).
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acknowledges that what is being done to her corresponds to
her own will. In legal terms, this implies that the one who
administers the chosen phenomenon to the subject cannot
be held liable for consequences that are within the scope of
the consent. For this to be the case, the information given to
the subject must be adequate for her to take an unbiased
decision. It also implies that some things cannot be done to
a subject without this type of consent, and that, if subjects
are unable to give such a consent, they are not eligible for
the treatment.
Although often seen in a medical or research context,
informed consent also appears in for example the European
Data Directive, concerning the processing of personal
data.26 This means that consent of the subject can be
required before processing certain types of sensitive per-
sonal data, the main concern obviously being informational
privacy. For the consent to be informed, the subject needs
to be informed of the nature of the processing. If no con-
sent is obtained, the processing is illegal. The concept thus
serves as a demarcation of the boundary between legal and
illegal actions.
In a broader sense, the notion is important to understand
the meaning of explanation and trust for responsibilities.
For information systems, the act of informing refers to the
explanation of the system to the user, and the object of
consent is the use of the system (or its outputs). The main
question here is what can be said to be informed consent
given the characteristics of the explanation of an IT system,
and what needs to be denoted rather as uninformed consent,
informed dissent, or uninformed dissent. This has conse-
quences for responsibility, as we will see. Legal conse-
quences could also be derived from the analysis, but these
are not the focus of the present work.
My point of view here is that ‘informed’ does not merely
indicate that sufficient information has been given, but also
that the type of explanation is justifiable and that not too
much information is given. This is directly related to the
concepts of explanation-for-trust and explanation-for-
confidence, as the goals of these types of explanations are
different. One cannot speak about informed consent if one
gives too little information, but one cannot speak about
informed consent either if one gives too much. Indeed, giv-
ing too much information might lead to uninformed dissent,
as distrust is invited by superfluous information. When the
user has a choice between different alternatives, explana-
tions-for-trust needs to contribute to the understanding of the
issues by the user. When there is only one sensible option,
explanations-for-confidence can help in justifying it to the
user. If an explanation-for-confidence does not suffice, and
the user wishes to consider alternatives anyway, the system
should be able to switch to an explanation-for-trust.
The characteristics of the explanations given by IT
systems may have consequences for responsibility. If an
acceptable kind of explanation is given, and the user trusts
the application based on the explanation (informed con-
sent), the user can be said to share the responsibility for the
consequences of using the system.
The question of responsibility holds both for security
and for AI. If the designers of a secure system can explain
security measures and remaining risks to the user (expla-
nation-for-trust), the user can be said to have a reasonable
choice in deciding to use the system or not. Given the
explanation, the user will not be able to hold the system (or
its designers) responsible for security failures, because she
has been given proper information about security measures
and remaining risks. In such a case, responsibility for the
risks could be said to rest with the user (even though leg-
islation may judge otherwise).
In AI, a user of an expert system can be held responsible
for a decision made with use of the system, as long as the
user has a reasonable way of knowing whether the decision
proposed by the system is sensible (explanation-for-con-
fidence). A decision or diagnosis proposed by the system,
when accompanied by a satisfying explanation, will keep
the user responsible for accepting or rejecting the proposed
solution, and thereby avoid users shirking their own
responsibility.
These concepts will become increasingly important with
the advent of ambient intelligence,27 which exhibits both
the features of AI and security-sensitive systems. When
everything in our environment is collecting information
about us and making decisions for us, we will need a way
of consenting to what is happening, or we will not be
responsible for anything. This makes a remaining question
quite urgent, which is how the socio-technical system
around information systems can be designed such that the
required explanations can be provided. It is important to
avoid the pitfalls of explanation there.
There are two ways in which explanations can miss their
goal. Too little detail does not explain-for-trust: it fails to
open the black box, by only providing superficial reasons.28
These reasons are usually ‘why’-explanations instead of
26 See e.g. Kosta et al. (2010).
27 Cf. Brey (2005): ‘‘Using smart objects requires a basic trust in
their judgments, and if these judgments conflict with the user’s own
judgments or intuitions, then the user has to choose whether to rely on
herself or on a piece of technology that may or may not know her
better than she does herself.’’ See also Kosta et al. (2010).
28 Tavani (2004) provides an interesting discussion of the relation
between informed consent and ‘opacity’, which is comparable to
‘blackboxness’.
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‘how’. For example, the government may say that the
e-voting systems are secure because they have been
accredited. Such explanations may contribute to confidence
(and were helpful in the Dutch case), but fail when trust is
required, because the black box is not being opened. Too
much detail, on the contrary, does not explain-for-trust. It
fails to make the system comprehensible, because the user is
not capable of processing the information at this level of
detail.
A too detailed explanation-for-confidence may fail to
reach its goal, because it does not explain-for-confidence. It
aims for trust instead of confidence, by opening the black
box of the system. For example, a system may provide a
complete reasoning trace when only some indications are
required by the user in order to provide her with confidence.
In that case, it may even decrease confidence. On the other
hand, too little detail will not explain-for-confidence.
Explanations, therefore, should (1) aim for the right goal
(why or how) and (2) carry the right amount of informa-
tion, in order to provide informed consent to the user, and
thereby keep (human) responsibilities clear. Thus, the level
of abstraction on which the explanation is given needs to be
right in order to speak about informed consent of the user.
We can map levels of detail to different results of expla-
nations (Table 1).
All of this, obviously, does not mean that designers will
no longer be responsible for what their systems do, as long
as they have consent from the user. On the contrary, the
designers are responsible for designing their systems in
such a way that responsible behaviour by their users is
encouraged. But users can only act responsibly if they have
access to the right explanations.
Conclusions
In this paper, I analysed the relation between explanations
and trust in information systems, in particular security-
sensitive applications and expert systems. From the liter-
ature, I took the distinction between confidence and trust,
different explanation goals and Latour’s concepts of action
program, translation, composition, blackboxing and dele-
gation. Combining these in a conceptual analysis, I
introduced the new notions of explanation program,
explanation-for-confidence and explanation-for-trust.
The framework helps us to make clear what we mean
when we say that a system has to be able to explain things
to the user, or that the system itself needs to be explainable.
The analysis illuminates the difference between the use of
explanations in AI and the use of explanations in infor-
mation security.
In information security, explanation is mostly aimed at
transparency with respect to security measures; this
requires opening the black box of the system. In AI,
explanation is mostly used to give the user confidence
in the decisions of the system. This does not require
opening the black box. The user is generally not interested
in how the system reached the decision, but primarily in
why it is judged to be a good decision.
I discussed that a bad explanation-for-trust may fail to
create trust: too little detail does not explain-for-trust; too
much detail does not explain-for-trust. A too detailed
explanation-for-confidence may fail to reach its goal,
because it does not explain-for-confidence; too little detail
does not explain-for-confidence. Only if the right kind of
information is given can informed consent on using the
system and its outputs be established, and can responsi-
bility be clearly allocated.
The relation between explanation and trust is especially
critical in the case of e-trust, as in a digital environment
other mechanisms that relate to embodied presence are
unavailable. Therefore, explanations may be an important
prerequisite for the building of e-trust. In that case, the
properties of the explanation programs, and the associated
modes of trust, are vital for assigning responsibilities.
In this paper, I focused on trust of the user in the system.
When explanations need to be given not only to humans
but also to computer agents, explanations will probably
take a different form. How the difference between confi-
dence and trust can be applied in such a setting, and
whether mutual trust between artificial agents can be
addressed from the perspective of explanations, are inter-
esting questions for future research.
I hope that the concepts I introduced are able to generate
lively discussions on implementations of technology and
the associated explanation obligations in general. Do not
hesitate to contact me for further explanation on how and
why I devised this framework.
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